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IN THE SUPREME COUR'T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE C. CLOSE, 
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent, 
-vs.-
HAROLD G. BLUMENTHAL and 
VIRGINIA A. BLUMEN·THAL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9196 
This is an appeal from a judgment for specific per-
formance of a written instrument entered by the District 
Court for Utah County, State of Utah, on December 14th, 
1959. 
The statement of facts are simple and the matters 
presented on this appeal involve principally questions of 
law. On the 28th day of April, 1959, at Provo, Utah 
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County, Utah, Harold G. Blumenthal and Virginia A. 
Blumenthal signed an instrument in writing denominated 
"Earnest Money Receipt-and Offer to Purchase," as buy-
ers, and by Wayne C. Close as seller, a married man, and 
whose wife has never signed the said instrument. The 
original earnest money receipt and offer to purchase is 
attached to the Findings of the Court, (R. 36). 
At the time the Blumenthals signed the earnest 
money receipt they deposited with the real estate agent 
for the seller the sum of $500.00. Said receipt provided: 
"In the event the purchaser fails to pay the 
balance of said purchase price, or complete said 
purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid 
hereon shall, at the option of the seller, be retained 
as liquidated and agreed damages." 
It was stipulated by and between the parties that 
Harold G. Blumenthal notified the attorney for the 
plaintiff on or about the 15th day of June, 1959, that 
the buyers did not intend to go through with the contract. 
It was further stipulated between the parties that the 
$500.00 deposit was never returned to the defendants, or 
any part thereof prior to the commencement of the action 
for specific performance. No offer has been made to re-
turn it to the defendants since. (Tr. 3 and±). R. 23. 
A complaint was filed by the plaintiff on June 24th, 
1959, and prayed for a judgment against the defendant~ 
to perform said agreement, and to pay the plaintiff the 
sum of $25,500.00, the remainder of the purchase price, 
with interest from April 28th, 1959, at the rate of 6% per 
annum; attorney fees in the amount of $2500.00 and 
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costs. The defendants filed an answer denying the alle-
gations of the complaint, and amended this answer al-
leging certain affirmative defenses on July 30th, 1959, 
and prayed that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint. 
On August 21st, 1959, the defendants filed a motion for 
smmnary judgment, (R. 22), which was denied by the 
trial court, (R. 24). A petition thereafter was filed with 
the Supreme Court requesting an interlocutory appeal 
from the motion denying said: judgment, which petition 
was denied. The only pertinent facts in dispute are those 
set forth in paragraph 3, 5 and 7 of the findings of the 
court, (R. 34), to which finding~ the defendant objected, 
and filed a motion along with their objecti.ons. to amend 
the findings of the court in these respects. The defendants 
contending in their objections that there is nothing in 
the evidence or the testimony to . warrant the court's 
findings as set forth in paragraphs 3, 5 and 7. In other 
words the court found "3. That on the 1st day of June, 
1959, the plaintiff was ready, able and willing to perfonn 
the contract as set forth in the plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.'' 
This finding was objected to by the defendants and is 
disputed, (R. 43). The defendants disputed and objected 
to the findings of the court in paragraph 5 as follows : "5. 
The court finds that the foregoing facts were not disputed 
by the defendants at the pretrial hearing or at the time of 
the trial," which the defendants did dispute and now 
dispute and have always disputed. The findings in para-
graph 5 would be an admission that the defendants 
accepted without dispute the findings set forth in para-
graph 3. The court found as set forth in paragraph 7 of 
its findings, "7. The court finds that vV ayne C. Close, 
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the plaintiff, was a married man on April, the 28th, 1959 
and on June 1st' 1959. The court further finds that on 
June 1st, 1959, the plaintiff was ready, willing and able to 
convey the property described in Exhibit 1 by warranty 
deed executed by the ·plaintiff and the plaintiff's wife." 
The defendants objected to this finding for the reason 
that there was never any tender of performance made by 
the plaintiff and plaintiff's wife, or by the plaintiff 
himself and there is nothing in the evidence to warrant 
-such findings by the court. The complaint was not 
filed until June 20th, 1959. The earliest date of a 
deed, discussed later, is July 30th, 1959. The objec-
tions of the defendants to the ·findings of the court 
was partially remedied by admission by the plaintiff's 
attorney at the hearing on the motion to amend the 
findings of the court. (See proceedings on objections 
to the court's findings of fact, January 11th, 1960, at 
page 3, line 3.) 
Therefore the defendants deny, (1) that Wayne C. 
Close was ready, able and willing to perform the contract 
on the 1st day of June, 1959, as found by the court in 
paragraph 3 of its findings. Such finding is clearly out-
side ·the evidence or record. The same is true with the 
finding of the court in paragraph 5 and no deed was ever 
introduced into evidence until after both the plaintiff and 
the defendants had rested their cases and then allowed 
to be introduced t\n) months and one day as a side issue 
during the hearing on the n1otion to amend the court's 
findings of f aet. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION PRO-
VIDED IN THE RECEIPT BY RETENTION OF THE DOWN 
PAYMENT, AND THEREBY TERMINA'TED THE AGREE-
MENT. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT SUED UPON IS NOT ENFORCE-
ABLE IN ·EQUITY. 
POINT III 
'THE AGREEMENT IS NOT ENF;ORCEABLE AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANTS FOR WANT OF MUTUALITY: 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF NEVER MADE A TIMELY OFFER 
TO PERFORM THE AGREEMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION PRO-
VIDED iN THE RECEIPT BY RETENTION OF THE DOWN 
PAYMENT, AND THEREBY TERMINATED THE AGREE-
MENT. 
The defendants contend that the case at bar is con-
trolled by the decision of this court on February lOth, 
1959, in the case of Andreason vs. Hansen, 335 Pacific 
2d, 404, wherein the plaintiff brought an action for 
general damages upon the very same ktnd of a receipt 
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involved in this case) without ever having returned the 
earnest money paid. This court held : upon breach of 
the terms of the receipt by the buyers the sellers exer-
cised their option to accept as liquidated damages the 
earnest money deposit by retention thereof, and pre-
cluded them from further remedy. In the Andreason 
Case the Salt Lake Real Estate Board filed a petition 
for rehearing, and brief as amicus curiae, again pre-
sented the question to this court, under Point No. 2 of 
their brief, as follows: "THE HOLDING OF THE 
COURT THAT THE RETENTION OF THE DOWN 
PAYMENT CONSTITUTED AN ELECTION TO AC-
CEPT THE DOWN PAYMENT AS LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND HARM-
FUL TO BOTH BUYERS AND SELLERS." The 
Petition for rehearing was denied by this Court. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff never returned the 
earnest money, or any part thereof, or made any offer 
to return the san1e to the defendants at any time. R. 23; 
Tr. 3 and 4. On page 408 of the Report of the Andreason 
Case Judge Crockett stated: 
"A further and fatal failty in the judgment 
bY the trial court that the sellers did not exercise 
their option to forfeit the defendant's $50.00 de-
posit. Nat-withstanding the plaintiff's assertion 
that they would not keep the Inoney as liquidated 
damages, their conduct must be regarded as 
speaking louder than their words. The fact is 
that the defendant's $50.00 was kept, and that 
there \\'as no return, nor tender of return of the 
money. \Ve are not unn1indful of the testimony 
to the effect that the $50.00 was in the custody 
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of the Holt Realty ConqJan~L But that company 
wa~ the appointed agent and acting for the plain-
tiff, and the money was thus constructively in 
their possession. The plaintiff, as an attorney, 
assumed to advise the defendants as to the tech-
nical effect of the earnest 1noney receipt. In doing 
so he was aware, or should have been, that the 
provisions he now relies upon gave him, at best, 
a choice of two alternatives; either to keep the 
amount paid in as liquidated damages, or to rely 
upon the offer to purchase. The fact that the 
1noney was kept is incontrovertible evidence that 
the plaintiff exercised the option to keep it. That 
being so they must be deemed to have kept it for 
the purpose indicated in the contract, that is as 
liquidated damages." 
In the same case, on page 409 of the report, Henroid, 
Justice, concurring in the result stated as follows: 
"I agree with the result for but one reason 
which I consider determinative, and which I be-
lieve obviates the necessity of treating any other 
phase of this case. It was agreed that the sellers, 
at their option, could retain the amount advanced 
as liquidated damages if the buyers broke their 
promise. The buyers broke their promise and the 
sellers retained the amount advanced. In my 
opinion such retention constitutes an exercise of 
the option, and precluded the sellers from pur-
sueing any other remedy." 
The only difference between the Andreason Case 
and the Case at Bar is that the Andreason Case was an 
action for general damages, whereas the case at bar is 
an action for specific performance for the price, which 
in actuality is nothing more than an action for damage;;;, 
except that the measure of damages is determined by 
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the amount agreed upon whereas in an action at law 
the dmnages are determined by legal rules. 
· Again in the Andreason Case Henroid, .Justice, 
concurring in the results stated : 
"It ,is inconsistent for the sellers holding the 
buyers to the. terms of the contract, and at the 
same time retain the money that they agreed 
would be the measure of damages upon breach, if 
they retained it. Such inconsistency must be re-
solved against the sellers who not only furnished 
the printed contract, (as in the case at bar) but 
who had the power of election." (words in paren-
theses are ours). · 
It may be contended by the plaintiff that it is futile 
to require him to return the earnest money, prior to a 
suit for specific performance, and then require the 
defendant to turri around and hand it back as a 
part of the purchase price if a judgment is rendered 
against him. . The question however, has been resolved 
in the Andreason Case, that such retention is an exercise 
of option, and that before any other remedy might be 
pursued it is necessary for the plaintiff to return the 
earnest money to the defendants. The question here 
presented cannot be · interpreted as a provision for 
(a) security of performance of a contract; or (b) as 
one providing for a penalty, but gives the seller an option 
to retain as agreed and liquidated damages, the earnest 
money deposit or resort to other remedies. It gives him a 
right to do one or the other; not a right to do both. So that 
if he retains the money paid dmvn without returning 
the same or offering to return it before filing a suit for 
10 
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specific perforumnce he already has Inade the choice 
open to hiin; has exercised his option to take liquidated 
damages in lieu of other relief. 
We are not dealing with a provision in a contract 
where the sun1 forfeited Inight be accounted as liqui-
dated damages, but with one that gives the seller a 
choice to accept the money as liquidated damages upon 
breach of the buyer, or not to accept it and otherwise 
stand on the promise. If by his actions he does the first, 
the choice has been made and the option spent. He does 
not have another or second choice; he has but one, and 
by choosing the first it follows that he is precluded from 
pursuing the second. The same rule applies whether the 
action is one for damages at law, for breach of the 
defendant's promise or by a suit in equity for specific 
performance of the promise. 
The measure of relief agreed upon is set forth in 
the printed form furnished by the plaintiff. He could 
not keep the money paid down on the one hand as liqui-
dated damages and at the same time claim other and 
additional relief on the other, since the first is a substi-
tute for the latter. 
If the option provision to retain as liquidated dam-
ages the earnest money, diCI not provide for adequate 
and satisfactory relief in case of breach by the buyer, 
why did the seller make it a part of the contract at all1 
Other remedies open to him already existed as a matter 
of equity and law. Was it inserted as a penalty 1 No. 
As security for performance1 No. As this court has 
11 
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held on that very question involving the identical option 
in the same kind of a receipt : 
"The fact that the money was kept is incon:. 
trovertible evidence that the plaintiff exercised 
the option to keep it. That being so, they must 
be deemed to have kept it for a purpose indicated 
in the contract, that is, as liquidated damages." 
· Andreason vs. Hanson, 335 Pac. 2d. Page 408. , 
In Rose vs. Garn, 56 Utah 533, 191·Pacific 645, this 
Court held 
"Under an agreement whereby abstract and 
. deed were placed in escrow and were to be de-
livered to grantee upon .payment of certain 
amounts and providing for forfeiture of sums 
paid as liquidated damages, on buyer's breach, 
held, that failure of the grantee to make one of 
such payments terminated the transaction, and 
the vendor was entitled only to retention of the 
inst.allments paid and repossession of the prop-
erty and could not specifi;cally enforce the agree-
ment as a contract of sale of the property." 
In the case at bar the defendants have never been 
in possession of the premises set forth in the plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
In Dropp vs. Richards, 43 Utah 341, 135 Pac. 99, this 
court held: 
"Unless a contract is oppressive, unconscion-
able, or against public policy, the courts will allow 
the parties to stipulate for themselves whether a 
provision for a forfeiture shall be a penalty or 
liquidated damages." 
Whether a stipulation for forfeiture of breach of 
an executory contract shall be construed as a penalty, 
12 
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or a~ liquidated dan1ages, n1ust be detennined from the 
terms of the contract. 
""Where an executory contract for the sale of 
land provided for the forfeiture, as liquidated 
damages, of the amount of the payments made by 
the purchaser in the event of his failure to com-
plete the purchase, and it appeared that the ad-
vance pay1nents required to be made by the pur-
chaser were practically equal to the rental value 
of the land for the time he was in possession 
under the contract, and that such payments added· 
to the value of the land at the time the vendor 
took it, exceeded the total amount due under the 
contract, including interest, the stipulation will 
be treated as one for liquidated damages, and not 
as a penalty regardless of whether the purchaser 
had made the advanced payments called for by 
the contract." Cooley vs. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 
Pac. 977. 
Defendants have never clai1ned to own the property 
either equitably or legally, but have been bound to do 
nothing more than to forfeit the $500.00, or pay the 
balance of the purchase price and require the convey-
ance of the property, at the option of the seller. The 
fact is, that the plaintiff is in as good position now as 
when he Inade the contract, as he has the property and 
he has shown no damage at all, and in view of this fact 
the forfeiture of $500.00 is adequate compensation. 
In Cooley vs. Gall, 211 Pacific 977, at the top of page 
980 this court said : 
"There is little or no difference in principle 
between that case (the Dopp Case) and this. In 
that case the plaintiff resumed possession of the 
13 
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land and brought an action for damages. In this 
case the plaintiff sued for specific performance 
of the contract. The rules in each case are the 
same for deterrn/tning the question whether or not 
the damages stipulated in the contract are to be 
reg.arded as liquidated, and therefore exclus~ve of 
other remedies,. or whether they- are a penalty for 
non performance. In that case, (the· Dopp Case) 
this court, after a careful review. of the facts and 
the law applicable thereto, 43 Utah, Page 341, 135 
Pacific, Page · 102, uses the following language: 
'Take any view we please of the contract in ques-
tion, its terms were all fair and entirely propor-
tioned to the damages that might be sustained, 
upon the one hand, or the benefits that might 
accrue the other. Under such circumstances the 
court is not justified in departing from the terms 
of the ~ontract with regard to the damage stipu-
lated· therein but is required to enforce that stirp-
ulatvon the same as all other stipulations in the 
contract.' " 
uwe are of the opinion therefore that the 
amount ~stipulated as constituting liquvdated.dam-
ages in the contract in question cannot be con-
stnted as a penalty, but mu,st be held to be liqui-
dated dam.ages, and must be enforced as·such." 
(words in parentheses are ours). 
POIN'T II 
THE AGREEMENT SUED UPON IS NOT ENFORCE-
ABLE IN. EQUITY. 
"Where the parties to any agreement, what-
ever may be the subject 1natter, or the terms, 
have added a provision for the payment, in case 
of a breach, of a c.ertain sum which is truly liqui-
dated damages, and not a penalty - in other 
14 
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words where the contract stipulates for one of two 
things in the alternative, the performance of 
certain acts, or the payment of a certain amount 
of rnoney in lieu thereof, equity will not interfere 
to decree a specific performance of the first alter-
native, but will leave the injured party to his 
legal remedy of recovering the money specified 
in the second. The reason for this rule is, that 
the parties have formally agreed upon the com-
pensation - have assessed 'the damages - and 
have thereby declared that an appeal to equity is 
unnecessary, since they have made the l~gal relief 
adequate.'' Pomeroy, Specific Performance of 
Contracts, 3rd Edition, Section 50, Page 134. 
If the parties to the receipt have provided therein 
for liquidated damages in breach of the conditions there-
of by the buyer, they have provided for an adequate 
remedy at law as has been held.in the Andreason vs. 
Hansen, and therefore, equity would not take jurisdic-
tion to grant specific performance. 
"A complete and adequate legal remedy 
authorizes denial of specific performance." Hal-
loran Judge Trust ·Co. vs. Heath, 258 Pac. 242, 70 
Utah 124. 
We can find no cases where an option provision in 
the contract, such as the one at .bar, has been made for 
the benefit of the seller, and he has exercised that option 
by retention of the down payment, that he has thereafter 
been given the right of specific performance. 
In line 44 of the original receipt, R. 36, attached to 
the Findings of the court the following is provided: 
"In the event seller has entered into a listing 
contract with any other agent, and said contract 
15 
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is presently effective this paragraph will be of 
no force or effect." 
The paragraph refe~red to includes lines 39 to 44 
inclusive. Therefore, until there is evidence that another 
listing has not been made by the seller, making the receipt 
presently effective, specific performance should not be 
entertained. It is inequitable and unjust to permit the 
plaintiff to specifically enforce a contract before it has 
been proven that no previous listing has been made with 
other brokers. It cannot be determined that there is a 
complete and binding contract until such fact is estab-
lished or that a complete and enforceable contract exists. 
An elementary rule in equity is : 
"A greater amount or degree of certainty is 
required in the terms of an agreement which is 
to be specifically executed in equity than is neces-
sary in a contract which is to be the basis of an 
action at law . for damages." Pomeroy Specific 
Performance of Contracts, 3rd Edition, Section 
159, Page 404. 
POINT III 
THE AGREEMENT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANTS FOR WANT OF MUTUALITY. 
In the case at bar the wife of the plaintiff never 
signed the receipt upon which the action is brought, nor 
was she ever made a party plaintiff to the action. 
Iri Candland vs. Oldroyd, et al, 67 Utah 605, 248 
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"A contract to be binding upon one must 
likewise be binding upon the other. If one party 
has a right to insist upon specific performance, 
the other party to the contract must likewise have 
the same right. Tested by the elementary con-
siderations that enter into every contract, we are 
unable to conclude that any contract existed, 
growing out of this correspondence.'' 
In Woolsey vs. Draper, et ux, 103 Ore. 103, 201 Pac. 
730, the Supreme Court of Oregon held: 
"The rule is settled in this State that in suits 
for specific performance of contracts for the sale 
of land, where the wife having a right of dower 
in the land, is sued jointly with her husband upon 
a contract not binding on her, and the object of 
the suit is to divest her of her inchoate right of 
dower, the suit cannot be maintained against her 
nor against her husband unless prior to the decree 
in the lower court the plaintiff elects to accept 
the deed of the husband alone because as to her 
the contract lacks mutuality. The court will not 
coerce the wife to perform a contract made by 
her husband alone, which she is not legally bound 
to perform. This rule, however, must be limited to 
cases where the wife has a present existing right 
of dower in the lands involved." See Weatherford 
vs. Weatherford et al, 260 P 2d 1097. 
If the parties in this action had been reversed the 
plaintiff could not have coerced the wife to perform the 
contract or give up her inchoate dower intere~t for the 
reason that she was not a party to the contract, and 
therefore, if the contract lacks mutuality as to her, it 
17 
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also lacks mutuality as to the defendants in the present 
case when they are sued by the plaintiff alone, the 
wife of the plaintiff being neither a party to the action 
nor a signatory to the receipt. 
It may be stated, as was affirmed in the case of 
Candland vs. Oldroyd above, that if one party has a right 
to insist upon specific perfO'rmance the other party to the 
contract must likewise have the same right, and the 
reverse of it is, that, if one party doesn't have the right 
neither does the other. 
In Hart vs. Turner, 226 Pacific 282, 39 Idaho, 50, 
the court held : 
"Where from the inception of the contract, 
to and including the time of the trial, the vendor 
in a contract for the sale of land is unable to 
perform the contract according to its terms, spe-
cific performance "\\ill not be decreed against the 
vendee." Tucker vs. Finch, 188 Pacific 235. 
"Specific performance of a contract will not 
be compelled where its validity depends upon the 
approval of a third person, and where the con-
sent or approval of such third person has not 
been obtained, and tendered at the time specific 
performance is sought." 
Hardy vs. Deskins, 215 Pacific, 738, 95 Oklahoma, 
108. 
"The test of n1utuality in specific perform-
ance action is rnutuality of remedy whether the 
agreement is such that equity would decree 
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specific perfonnance for either party." Wheat 
vs. Thomas, 209 Cal.· 306, 287 Pac. 102.1 
"To be specifically enforceable, an agreement 
must be definite in its terms, and party seeking 
specific perf()rrnance must establish by clear and 
satisfactory proof, the existence of the contract 
alleged." Store Properties vs. Neal, 164 Pacific 
2d 38, 72 California Appeals 2d, 112. 
The theory upon which a vendor of real property 
can sue in specific performance for the price is that of 
mutuality of remedy, otherwise damages at law would 
be an adequate remedy, and he would thereby be pre-
cluded from sueing in equity for specific performance. 
But since a purchaser of land (land bein·g regarded as 
unique) can maintain a suit for specific performance, 
equity on the basis of mutuality of remedy usually grants 
the vendor the right to specific performance ·when he is 
only to receive money. This being so, it is very import-
ant that Inutuality of remedy exists in favor of the 
vendee, otherwise a great advantage is given to the 
vendor if he can compel specific execution of a land con-
tract against a purchaser, when the vendor's wife has 
not signed, and he sues ·only for the price. If the pur-
chaser cannot sue and obtain the whole estate of both 
the seller and his wife, then the seller ought not to be 
tAlso the same effect, Hupp vs. Lawler, 288 Pacific, 801, 
106 California Appeals, 121. Moody vs. Crane, 199 Pacific, 
652, 34 Idaho, 103. Poultry Producers of Southern California 
vs. Barlow, 208 Pacific 93, 189 Cal. 278. See also Parker vs. 
Grainger, 149 Pacific 2d, 625, 158 Kansas, 706. Schneidau vs. 
Manley, 39 Atlantic 2d, 885, 131 Connecticut 285. Ray Rich-
ardson, Inc. vs. Carlton, 191 Southern 433, 140 Florida 229. 
Baumann vs. Mchel, 181 Southern 549, 190 Louisiana, 1. Also 
176 Southern 907. 
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granted specific performance against the purchasers for 
the price. It is doubly important that mutuality of remedy 
exists in favor of the vendee as well as in favor of the 
vendor, for the latter can sue in damages for his money 
loss. But the loss of land, it is said, cannot be measured 
in money.1 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF NEVER MADE A TIMELY OFFER 
TO PERFORM THE AGREEMENT. 
The earnest money receipt (R. 36) provides in lines 
12 to 15 inclusive as follows: 
"The total purchase price of $26,000.00 
(Twenty Six Thousand and no j100 Dollars) shall 
be payable as follows: $-------------------------------which 
represents the afore described deposit, receipt of 
which is hereby ackknowledged by you; $------------·-
---------------- when the seller approves the sale: $25,-
500.00 on delt"very of deed or final contract of 
sale which shall be on or before June 1st, 1959 
* * * 
This agreement requires the seller to deliver a deed 
on or before the 1st day of June, 1959, before the defend-
ants, as buyers, would be liable to pay the $25,500.00, the 
balance of the purchase price. The seller never per-
formed or offered to perforn1 the contract on June 1st, 
1959, and no such offer to perfonn \vas ever made, 
except the deed above referred to as being admitted in 
evidence on January 11th, 1960, at the tilne of the 
lSee State Extrel-Place vs. Bland, 183 SW 2d, 878, 353 Mo., 639, 
Rice vs. Griffith, 144, SW 2d, 837, 56 NE 2d, 607, 316 Mass., 517, 
Lutz vs. Dutmer, 382 NW 431, 286 Mich. 467. 
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hearing on the defendant's motion to mnend the findings 
of the court. There is absolutely no proof in the record of 
any tender of performance on the part of the plaintiff 
on June 1st, 1959, or at any other time during the trial. 
The deed admitted in evidence was allowed to be intro-
duced two months and one day after the conclusion 
of the trial, and over the objections of the defendants, 
and without the court ever having reopened the case for 
the admission .of new evidence. See Tr. of Proceedings, 
Jan. 11, 1960, at page 4, line 23 to line 3 on page 5, also 
lines 16 and 17 on page 5. 
In paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint, (R. 3) plain-
tiff does allege that he was ready, willing and able to 
deliver to the defendant the deed to the premises pur-
suant to the agreement and offered ·to do so, etc. ,This 
allegation ·however, was denied by the answer of the de-
fendants, filed on July the 8th, 1959. This denial of the 
defendants was never altered or withdrawn but they 
amended the answer to effectuate setting up affirmative 
defenses which they did by an amendment to the answer, 
filed on July 30th, 1959. (R. 12 and 13.) 
It is true that the court in its findings, in paragraph . 
7, found that the plaintiff and his wife were able, ready 
and willing to convey the property described in Exhibit 
1, by warranty deed executed by the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff's wife. This _finding, of course, was objected to 
and the motion to amend it was made by the defendants. 
A hearing thereon was held January 11th, 1960. The 
paragraph was amended in some respects, to wit: "that 
the plaintiff Wayne C. Close, was at all times during the 
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proceedings herein, a married man," but the finding that 
the plaintiff, Wayne C. Close, and his wife, were ready, 
able and willing to convey the property by warranty 
deed executed by them is that part of the finding which 
has no justification, and there is no evidence, and such 
fact was never proved, or offered to be proved by a deed 
then executed. The wife of the plaintiff was never in 
Court to testify and was never a party to the suit. The 
first time there was any tangible evidence of a deed 
was when it was filed four days after the judgment 
on December 18th, 1959. Both the plaintiff and the 
defendant had rested their cases on November 10, 1959. 
(Tr. 28, lines 13 and 15) It had never been introduced into 
evidence. The court's attention is called to the fact that 
this deed is dated the 16th day of December, 1959, two 
days after the judgment, together with its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed and filed by the 
court. (R. 46). It will be noted that this deed is dated De- . 
cember 16th, 1959, signed by Wayne C. Close and Norma 
W. Close, and acknowledged before Dallas H. Young, Jr., 
who filled in the blank, and the date when his commission 
expires and his residence, and also the blank left for 
mailing the tax notice to Harold G. Blumenthal. There 
is another deed which appears on the scene, and this one 
is signed by Wayne C. Close and Norma W. Close but 
dated July 30th, 1959. It was this deed that was ad-
mitted into evidence two months and one day after the 
conclusion of the case, over the objection of counsel for 
the defendants, without reopening the case, or any order 
to that effect having been made, but toward the termina-
tion of the hearing on the defendant's objection to the 
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court's findings of fact. and nwtion to mnend them. 
It will be noted that this deed is dated prior to the first 
deed filed, but was never, offered into evidence until 
January 11th, 1960, and filed that day. On this deed 
the expiry date of the Notary's com1nission is not filled 
in, or his residence, with the mail tax notice left blank 
and also the residence of the grantees. One wonders 
why this deed, if in existence, was not filed first. Pretrial 
hearing was on the same day as this deed is dated. It 
was on January 11, 1960, that the plaintiff's attorney 
reminded the court he had in his possession at time of 
the pretrial this deed. (See proceedings of January 11th, 
1960 on the defendant's motion to amend the findings, 
at page 4, lines 4, 5 and 6.) 
It is elmnentary that before the plaintiff can obtain 
specific performance of this contract he himself must 
allege· and prove his offer to perform, or prove that he 
has fulfilled it or was willing to fulfill ~e contract, and 
no such evidence can be found during the trial of this case. 
The belated offer of the plaintiff to introduce a deed into 
evidence two Inonths and one day after the conclusion 
of the trial is irregular ~nd erroneous and it was error 
for the court to admit the same. Counsel for the plain-
tiff states that counsel for the defendants stipulated at 
the pretrial that there was no question of the plaintiff's 
offer to perforn1 or any question about the title he was 
to convey. Counsel for the defendants ernphatically deny 
this. There was no such stipulation and none can be found. 
The defendants have always contended, that without the 
plaintiff's wife's signature on the contract, he could not 
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be made to convey the whole e~tate in the property; and 
without first offering to perform pn the date due, or at 
least by introducing such offer seasonably and properly 
into evidence, the defendants were never bound. Such is 
their position now and has been consistently, regardless 
of the findings of the court and the innuendos of counsel. 
In Altman vs. McDonald, 12, Atlantic 2d, 230, 64 
Rhode Island, 311 the court held : 
"In suit for specific performance for con-
tract for sale of real estate, complainant had 
burden of showing that he was ready, able and 
willing to perform his part of the contract on the 
date when the performance was due· under the 
terms of the contract." 
Before the plaintiff can put the defendants in default 
so as to be able to sue for specific performance, he him-
self must have made a good tender, or performance on 
his part, by offering a deed on the date due, according 
to the terms of the earnest money receipt. Here the 
balance of the purchase price was to be paid upon t~e 
tender of the deed on June 1, 1959. However, a deed 
was never tendered.1 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that in accord-· 
ance with the law and the facts of this case and the 
authorities herein cited, that the defendants are entitled 
to a judgment; that the plaintiff take nothing by his 
complaint, and that the case be remanded to the District 
lSee also Long v. Reiss. 160 SW 2d, 668, 290 Ky. 198. Also, Kunz 
vs. Peters, 150 SW, 2d, 665, Dodge vs. Blood, 11 NW 2d, 846, 307 
Mich. 169. See Pomeroy, Specific Performance, 3rd Edition, Section 
62, Page 775. 
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Court for Utah County, with instructions to enter its 
judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLE.N S. HATCH 
A. M. MARSDEN 
616 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
